![42 usc 1981 fifth circuit court of appeals reversed frcp 8a 42 usc 1981 fifth circuit court of appeals reversed frcp 8a](https://i1.rgstatic.net/publication/228221598_Is_a_Full_Labor_Relations_Evidentiary_Privilege_Developing/links/55918eca08ae1e1f9baffa12/largepreview.png)
I would not, however, grant review of petitioner's third question: Whether offshore workers constitute a "discrete class" for equal protection purposes.Illiteracy and Social Security Disability Because these two questions are so related, I would grant review of petitioner's second question as well: Whether the term "attending" includes the filing of a claim in federal court. In any case, the intended scope of the term "attending" can only be determined by reviewing the same legislative history as is involved in resolving the question of whether an action under § 1985(2) must allege class-based discrimination. we can not hold that the use of the section in the opinion is not to be regarded as authority except by directly reversing the decision in that case on that point." Richmond Co. "It does not make a reason given for a conclusion in a case obiter dictum that it is only one of two reasons given for the same conclusion. The fact that the Court of Appeals could have relied solely on this ground to reverse the panel decision does not mitigate the precedential effect of its holding that invidious discrimination must be alleged to state a cause of action under § 1985(2), nor does it lessen the conflict in the Circuits: Because Congress had no similar concern over its authority to protect federal-court proceedings, there was no reason for a similar limitation on the first part of the statute.Īn alternative ground for the decision below was the majority's reversal of the panel's holding that the filing of a complaint in federal district court falls within the scope of the term "attending" as used in the statute. In their view, the second clause of § 1985(2) included the equal protection language because Congress was concerned about the constitutional source of its power to create federal jurisdiction over state torts or crimes. The dissent argued both that Griffin was inapplicable because it dealt only with § 1985(3) and that the intent of the Ku Klux Act of 1871 was broader than the majority suggested: "A major concern was restoration of civil authority and preservation of orderly government, including federal court ability to proceed without improper interference." 648 F.2d, at 350.
![42 usc 1981 fifth circuit court of appeals reversed frcp 8a 42 usc 1981 fifth circuit court of appeals reversed frcp 8a](http://uscode.house.gov/images/uscprelim/Apf4p3.gif)
1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), the majority held that an action under § 1985(2) must allege a racial or class-based animus. Relying in part on this Court's decision in Griffin v. Thus, the fact that the phrase "equal protection of the laws" is included in the second, but not the first, part of § 1985(2) is not as relevant to the proper interpretation of the statute as is the fact that all of § 1985(2) is derived from the Ku Klux Act of 1871. CA 5, 648 F.2d 340 (1981).īy a vote of 11 to 10, 3 the court held that the language of the statute is not as important as its history. A petition for rehearing en banc was granted and a severely divided Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. It held that under the first clause of § 1985(2)-that part of the statute applicable to interference with federal, as opposed to state, court proceedings-there is no requirement of discriminatory animus and that the scope of the term "attended" includes the filing of a complaint in federal court. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 269, 276 (ED La.1978)-required by the first clause. It held that the complaint failed to allege facts that would bring this case within either the first or second clause of § 1985(2): A conspiracy by employers to retaliate against employees for filing personal injury suits fails to allege either an intent to deny the equal protection of the laws-required by the second clause-or injury for "having attended or testified in federal court," 445 F.Supp. 2 The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment. § 1985(2) (1976 ed., Supp.III), sought damages for the class and a permanent injunction enjoining the challenged practices. 1 The complaint, based entirely on 42 U.S.C. Contending that he was fired by McDuffy because of this prior suit, petitioner filed a class action in Federal District Court on behalf of all individuals who had been denied employment by IFS members because they had filed workers' compensation or personal injury claims against companies in the oil drilling business. Petitioner alleges that when McDuffy joined IFS, McDuffy learned that petitioner had previously pursued a lawsuit in federal court against a former employer and had obtained a large judgment.